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Abstract: This chapter contains the argument against the unity of the virtues, which presupposes that the virtues are not unified and vindicates anti-imperialism about virtue. It describes the unity of the virtues that was more or less universally affirmed in ancient ethics and notes that the dominant tendency in contemporary moral philosophy is to reject it. It also sketches a position on the interrelation of the virtues that avoids the falsity of the unity thesis, while still salvaging some of its more attractive aspects. The chapter focuses on the thesis that one cannot have one virtue without having all of the others. It elaborates that if there is any one virtue that a person lacks, then it follows that this person does not have any of the other virtues.

Abstract: This chapter traces philosophical discussions of character education that typically assume that virtue should be taught and clarifies whether it can be taught. It develops several different arguments for the paradoxical conclusion that virtue should not be taught, even when it can be taught. It also cites a dialogue in Plato's Meno, in which the character named Meno evidently presupposes that virtue should be acquired, if only it can be. The chapter examines the extent to which the viability of Meno's presupposition is affected by the specific modalities of character education on how virtue is to be acquired, rather than if it can be acquired. It distinguishes between two different models of virtue acquisition: the ham-fisted Aristotelian model and the Fosbury model.